I thought it better to get this out in bite size bits, and give you more time to digest it. This will be subject to further changes and additions, but hopefully this will help.
I will suggest that we reach truth through a process which is in some ways both historical, and scientific. Therefore, the background is the story.
I want to make my method clear here, I am following my own advice. As a philosopher who has invested considerably in the ideas of other great philosophers, I am prepared to see their mistakes, and by luck and effort, to move on keeping corrections and getting rid of mistakes.. I also hope that this will hold for my own theories, where when criticism reveals fault I will be able to admit it. I will not assume, however, that it is all for nothing, but rather scrap what needs to be scrapped, and try again.
This is rather a sort of scientific method which has not often been admitted as a part of either the theological method, or the philosophical (I could well offer my own criticisms to my own field, and equally well to my own practices).
Kant, in response to Descartes’, and especially David Hume’s, works that, Kant believed, successfully demolished what had been the philosophical foundations western society, produced one of the most brilliant philosophical works of human history. The philosophy Kant laid out in Critique of Pure Reason, traditionally labeled as a Transcendental Idealism, makes a leap from the most basic conditions required for human experience to show what we must believe to make sense of that experience.
Whatever you think of all that, as brilliant as it may be, Kant then comes up with the Categorical Imperative which, in its most famous formulation reads, “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”
The power of this theory is incredible. It has many intuitive strengths: what is right is rational, universal, and not tied to what we might think is right or wrong. There is a real notion of duty and obligation, and ones motivations are paramount.
Additionally, the one of the seemingly magical properties of Kant’s Categorical Imperative is that, while being based on the apparently inhuman principle of pure reason and logical consistency, when applied to case studies we find the principle is very persuasive. This is because, while it often is far from what we might want it is certainly in tune with a moral intuition about what might be right in spite of what we want. It gives us a standpoint other then our own opinions from which we can judge both ourselves and others who might have a radically different cultural position.
It is these properties of Kant’s system that I will cling to, and perhaps Kant and I could come to some agreement, but I agree with Hegel that Kant’s principle must be humanized, that it must be grounded in the real and not merely and ideal, however transcendental.
Nearly sixty years later John Stuart Mill wrote the essay, “Utilitarianism,” which is often posited as the major opposition to Kant’s position. These two views are divided from each other in Utilitarianism is a form of consequentialism, meaning that the moral worth of an action is determined by its outcome, and Kantianism is deontological, which means that right and wrong is measured against a principle, and not by the results. However, I will suggest that it is the focus on this distinction that has led ethicists astray for so long, for really they are a dialectical unity, and this distinction between the two must be overcome rather than clarified.
Utilitarianism is the ethical doctrine that the moral worth of an action is solely determined by its contribution to overall utility. Here utility can be very easily understood as happiness. It
I will be sure to list several of utilitarianism’s philosophical and moral problems to assure people that I am not a Utilitarian, but there are also very good reasons for why it is as persuasive as it is. What happens to people matters, or, there is a real and significant connection between what is right and wrong and human flourishing.
I will go ahead and list several of the problems in utilitarianism, though this will not due justice to the debates, nor the work that has gone into overcoming these problems. I will say this though, about why I lean towards rejecting utilitarianism as an adequate ethical theory: for a theory that gains so much credibility from its simple and sensible seeming premises (though closer examination reveals them to be not quite as self evident as they might at first appear), utilitarianism requires an awful lot of work to overcome its many seemingly blatantly immoral outcomes in test scenarios.
Here are several problems with utilitarianism: it does not put any value on life, but merely happiness, so beings who do not promote happiness, or are not happy themselves, do not have value; it seems very difficult to properly valuate pleasure, happiness, and joy; there are not adequate predictive methods for calculating the results of actions; and utilitarianism does not take motives or intentions into account.
The first and the last are perhaps the most fatal of utilitarianism’s flaws, but the middle two certainly do not make the theory very practicable. All this said, the theory’s intuitive appeal, I am suggesting, is because it has some very important truths embedded in it that its founders almost certain grasped, though failed to fully work out.
The final ethical theory that I would like to lay out in brief is Social Contract Theory. But before I do I need to make a particular distinction very clear, that is, the distinction between true morality and our ethical practice. Now both Matt and I will be arguing there is a morality that objectively exists and by which we can judge human action. There are also all kinds of ways by which any individual decides what to do, and in some cases decides what is the right thing to do. The latter are not necessarily the same as the former, and so we have the possibility of studying human decision making processes as a separate study from objective ethics.
Political studies is a very obvious example of these kinds of studies where by we can examine all sorts of political practices, and the merits and problems in each, recognizing that these political practices are not the same as objective morality, but are obviously, in some way related to the subject.
Having said this, I bring up Social Contract Theory not because of its resemblance to objective morality, for the variety of “Social Contracts,” are a near proof for the subjective nature of the theory, but because of its potential for showing how people actually attempt to practice, “ethics,” in the world.
The term social contract describes a broad class of philosophical theories whose subjects are the implied agreements by which people form nations and maintain a social order. In laymen's terms, this means that the people give up some rights to a government in order to receive social order.
The starting point for most of these theories is a heuristic examination of the human condition absent from any social order, termed the “state of nature” or “natural state”. In this state of being, an individual’s action is bound only by his or her conscience. From this common starting point, the various proponents of social contract theory attempt to explain, in different ways, why it is in an individual’s rational self-interest to voluntarily submit the freedom of action one has under the natural state (their so called “natural rights”) in order to obtain the benefits provided by the formation of social structures (wiki).
I will suggest that almost all human “ethical” decisions are based on this sort of or an implied agreement. And there is no doubt that this is important for the relative flourishing of human society, but this does not either provide a description of what is right or, provide for this worlds salvation. My task is only the first of these two failures of social contract theory, but that will become clearer shortly.
My theory is more like a narrative then an argument. I will insist that anything of value arises out of free will – which is the source of contingency and potential – and is expressed in actuality – which is the result of the actualizing, or realizing, by a will. Free will is a fundamental reality that I do not intend to demonstrate or defend because it, by definition, does not submit to anything but itself. If I am pressed on this point, I would be willing to reconsider.
I will also offer, as the only theory I have currently been offered, and one that I think Matt will hopefully happily agree with, that God is the source of freedom. Additionally, I will submit that God is also the source of actuality. This means that I am not arguing God as the prime mover: there was nothing, and then God spoke into the darkness and there was something. And low and behold, God did not merely express himself in actuality, but did something truly new! Far greater then matter ex-nhilo, was the multiplication of wills. The world now becomes ever more a result of the actualizing of free wills which are not God’s, and the God, limits herself by her own will. Human freedom is the most terrifying truth, but it is true. I believe that I will take freedom, both God and man’s, more seriously then Matt.
To be honest, admitting God as the prime mover (though I do not believe that has been proven, only accepted), I have given Matt the fight. Whatever I say now about morality Matt may point to the beginning and say, “see, God is the source!” And I will happily concede, I am not out to win, but to find the truth. However, I think that Christian theology has led us far enough astray from being able to look at things from a step back, that Matt will find the rest of what I have to say difficult enough, despite the fact that ultimately the battle is his for the taking.
I am going to use the story of evolution as a metaphor, for I believe there is some truth to the story, both historically and morally, though the details may still need to be flushed out.
My account of evolution is primarily informed by Richard Dawkin’s book, The Selfish Gene. Again, before I summarize some of his story, I will set straight a few potential misunderstandings in advance. Richard Dawkin’s book is not a moral treatise. He is in no way arguing that selfish action is what is right. Additionally, he claims that as far as appearances have informed us, humans are actually exceptions to the rules he is laying out. Moraly he is something of a Social Contract Theorist, and might have a position in line with Richard Taylor.
His work is a scientific treatise on the theory of evolution which arises from certain explanations for apparently altruistic actions. Evolution tends to account for apparently altruistic by insisting that these actions are not purely altruistic, but have an alternative explanation (remember that Dawkin’s willingly admits humans as exceptions). One common account for apparently altruistic actions was the, “herd instinct,” whereby a species increases their chance of survival by an instinct to protect others in the herd even if it means increasing the risk of their own survival, and it is precisely this sort of explanation that Dawkin’s finds inadequate.
His story starts with the spontaneous appearance of replicators in some primordial goo. All sorts of things may have appeared and disappeared in this goo, but the replicators are the start of the story because by the merely coincidental fact that they happened to make copies of themselves, when they passed away they left copies behind to carry on the story.
This is a story that we all know, but, a bit like the gospel, it is one many of us misunderstand. For example, here are two facts about these “creatures.” The creatures that are most likely to avoid extinction are the ones that reproduce themselves in a faithful image of the original. This means that chances of survival of any particular species is increased by it’s potential to resist evolution. There is not drive in a species to evolve, rather, the evolution of a species potentially signals the extinction of its predecessor and any predecessor that has a drive towards extinction will never last, and neither will its successor unless it learns to resist mutation and copy itself faithfully.
These replicators to make errors in their replication, and those that do, by pure luck, re...
Wednesday, October 24, 2007
Matt's First Response
To begin I would like to extend my thanks to Jonathan Fairbridge for inviting me discuss the topic before us. In the short time I have gotten to know Jonathan as a friend and fellow teacher in Thailand I have been impressed by both his intelligence and his fervor to see the life of Christ revealed in greater measure. I do believe I share with Jonathan many of his concerns and criticisms on how a great portion of the Church has become contented to prop herself up as being the best edifice of religion and in so doing has failed miserably in both discovering God and sharing Him with a world desperate for His life and truth. I do believe this dialogue is not only significant but also timely and unique. The reader may initially be surprised to find that both Jonathan and I are committed Christians, yet one has sincere questions about the value of Christian apologetics and the alleged necessity to anchor morality into God’s existence. Unlike Jonathan, I do not view apologetics (or human reason for that matter) to be a crutch to true spiritual apprehension or maturity. I have no doubt that it CAN be but I see no reason to warrant that it MUST be. There are always two ditches on either side of the path of life and I have no doubt that an endeavor to apprehend God solely through strict rationality, argument and logic will ultimately leave one far removed from the true, spiritual treasures of faith, love and hope. However if one were to completely discard human reason, argument and logic from their faith it could potentially open one up to a host of wolfish beliefs disguised in spiritual sheep’s wool. As soon as our Lord Jesus’ feet left the earth we see such attempts of the Enemy to infiltrate the Church and rob her of her true faith. Ever since its conception the Church has had to battle numerous deceptions that would tempt her to depart from her inherited faith. A short perusal into early church history will reveal God’s providence in raising up wise shepherds to apologetically defend the true faith against some of these humanistic philosophies. In saying that I have no doubt that Jonathan is reacting against an extreme dependence on apologetics as if apologetic reasoning was necessary for true belief. While I can appreciate his concern I believe his reaction is so strong he simply falls into the opposite ditch. In my understanding I do not see apologetics as being necessary for faith but I do see it as being quite useful in the proper context. I can explain why in more detail if Jonathan would like me to elaborate. I do believe an a priori rejection of apologetics is the under-girding support structure for Jonathan’s position concerning the discussion at hand. For this reason I believe it will be necessary to question Jonathan’s dismissal of human reasoning in relation to spiritual value at a later time in the discussion.
My goal in this dialogue is to demonstrate that theism (or supernaturalism) is the only sufficient explanation that can account for objective morality. I will seek to show that a non-theistic position (naturalism) simply does not have the recourses to explain the full breadth of moral values.
Since this is my first posting I will content myself with critiquing some of John’s comments as well as responding to some of the queries he raised. After John posts the particulars of his position, I will lay out my case for why I believe theism provides the only sure foundation for morality to rest upon. One of John’s criticisms is that the “traditional, Christian, theistic explanation of morality has not been inconsistent but inadequate. God has not provided an explanation, but has actually been the explanation.” John feels that appealing to God as the final explanatory answer is akin to saying, “I don’t know.” For the most part I think this is a valid point and it could be that ushering G-O-D into the conclusion is a mark of laziness on the part of some. I will try my best to provide more than these three letters and actually explain why anchoring morality into God’s existence is the most reasonable and fitting conclusion one can come make. In saying that I’m not quite sure John’s contention is fully warranted. If the theist position is that morality is ultimately anchored into God’s existence than it is a bit unreasonable to require the theist to explain their position in terms which go beyond God, such that God’s existence is no longer the explanation. If John is saying the theist can’t just repeat the mantra, “God is the explanation” without explaining why God is the best explanation for morality’s existence, than I can definitely elaborate on the “why.” But if John is contending that the theist must continue his defense past God’s existence than it would be pointless for me to oblige. At some point both of our positions will have to arrive at some self-explanatory stopping point beyond which the discussion can go no further. My position posits a metaphysical ultimate and morality is defined in terms of its approximation to this. I have yet to see John’s ultimate but since he disavows the need of God’s existence I would have to assume that he will simply say, “Morality just is. Right and wrong exist independent of God.” I see great weakness here but I await John’s explanation before commenting further.
In regards to John’s questions I will offer three brief responses and elaborate later if necessary.
1) WHAT IS SIN? Sin is anything contrary to God’s moral essence. Being made in God’s image sin is the failure to do what morality obliges that we ought to do as bearers of God’s image.
2) WHAT IS GOOD? The Good is anything which is in alignment or in harmony with God’s moral essence- from which flows all moral obligation to His image bearers.
3) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF GOD’S AUTHORITY? I’m not sure what is being asked. So I will answer in accordance to what I think you are driving at and you can tell me if I need to address it from a different angle. If you are asking what is the source or standard for God’s moral authority I would say this moral standard or authority is God’s very nature. God is necessarily good and therefore it is logically impossible for Him to will evil. Because His nature is necessarily good all His actions are in perfect conformity with His good nature. God’s goodness is not the fulfillment of moral obligations that exist outside Himself, but rather expressions of the way He is. This avoids both the charge of arbitrariness on the part of God as well the need for an autonomous standard that exists independent of God which He must consult before acting. It is interesting to note that when Moses asked to see God’s glory, the text reveals that God’s response is that He will show Moses His glory “by having all my GOODNESS pass before you.” (Exodus 33:18). God’s glory is equated in terms of the fact that He is wholly good. I believe this is what Jesus had in mind when he said, “No one is good except my Father.”
Towards the end his last post John implies that traditional, theological answers concerning the aforementioned questions fall quite short of the mark and he labels them as “simplistic, malleable and useless.” We aren’t told exactly where “the mark” should be or why they are simplistic and useless but we do discover his motivation in deeming them as such; that being they do not provide the “ethical vision that Christ wants us to have when we attempt to live by the Spirit…” I am all for expanding our ethical vision such that God’s kingdom is established in greater measure and I applaud John’s desire to do so. Yet I remain skeptical at best that an ethical vision that deletes the need for God can truly function in such a God honoring way. But I wish him the best.
Lastly, John points to Calvinism’s systematic appraisal of God and morals as being an example of Christian, ethical theory gone to seed. I wholeheartedly agree with John’s appraisal. Thankfully one need not be a Calvinist in order to be Christian theist. In brief Calvinism’s understanding of good and evil is based on a radical form of “Voluntarism” which states something is right simply because God willed it to be right. In contrast Non-Calvinists such as myself affirm “Christian Essentialism” which is the view that God wills X because X is right and in accordance with His own, essential, unchangeable, moral nature. So as not to mistaken, the former claim something is right merely on the basis that God willed it to be right. The later contends that God wills it because it is right. But rather than God being bound to a moral standard that exists independent or outside Himself (such as Plato’s good), God wills in perfect concert with the standard inside Himself (His necessary, moral nature). The differences may not seem all that apparent but I assure you they are. Within a Calvinist construct it is possible for God to will that love is wrong and hate and injustice are the new moral values all humans are obligated to follow- simply on the basis of God’s sovereign willing. Such a view is morally repugnant to Non-Calvinist, essentialists like myself. So I share John’s misgivings that theological lapses concerning God and ethics has helped to foster various atrocities conducted by the so-called “church.” (I’m not saying Calvinism is to blame specifically). However I do not see how grounding morality in God’s existence and morally perfect nature leaves Christianity exposed to repeat such atrocities…far from it. In fact it is the naturalist (who denies God as a moral being and moral enforcer) who runs the grave risk of reducing morality down to subjective preferences of cultural opinion. History is very much stained with that reality as well. Moreover, by John’s use of the word “atrocities” I assume he sees these actions as being objectively evil. Hypothetically if God did not exist I see no sound basis for such an objective moral condemnation to be raised.
In conclusion I would simply ask John the same questions he raised with me, as well as two additional questions.
1) What is sin?
2) What is good?
3) What is the nature/standard of God’s moral authority?
4) Why is what humans perceive as evil truly evil and good truly good? How do humans reach this assessment?
5) If God did not exist would it be wrong for a society to purge itself of innocent, mentally handicapped persons? Why or why not?
Peace.
My goal in this dialogue is to demonstrate that theism (or supernaturalism) is the only sufficient explanation that can account for objective morality. I will seek to show that a non-theistic position (naturalism) simply does not have the recourses to explain the full breadth of moral values.
Since this is my first posting I will content myself with critiquing some of John’s comments as well as responding to some of the queries he raised. After John posts the particulars of his position, I will lay out my case for why I believe theism provides the only sure foundation for morality to rest upon. One of John’s criticisms is that the “traditional, Christian, theistic explanation of morality has not been inconsistent but inadequate. God has not provided an explanation, but has actually been the explanation.” John feels that appealing to God as the final explanatory answer is akin to saying, “I don’t know.” For the most part I think this is a valid point and it could be that ushering G-O-D into the conclusion is a mark of laziness on the part of some. I will try my best to provide more than these three letters and actually explain why anchoring morality into God’s existence is the most reasonable and fitting conclusion one can come make. In saying that I’m not quite sure John’s contention is fully warranted. If the theist position is that morality is ultimately anchored into God’s existence than it is a bit unreasonable to require the theist to explain their position in terms which go beyond God, such that God’s existence is no longer the explanation. If John is saying the theist can’t just repeat the mantra, “God is the explanation” without explaining why God is the best explanation for morality’s existence, than I can definitely elaborate on the “why.” But if John is contending that the theist must continue his defense past God’s existence than it would be pointless for me to oblige. At some point both of our positions will have to arrive at some self-explanatory stopping point beyond which the discussion can go no further. My position posits a metaphysical ultimate and morality is defined in terms of its approximation to this. I have yet to see John’s ultimate but since he disavows the need of God’s existence I would have to assume that he will simply say, “Morality just is. Right and wrong exist independent of God.” I see great weakness here but I await John’s explanation before commenting further.
In regards to John’s questions I will offer three brief responses and elaborate later if necessary.
1) WHAT IS SIN? Sin is anything contrary to God’s moral essence. Being made in God’s image sin is the failure to do what morality obliges that we ought to do as bearers of God’s image.
2) WHAT IS GOOD? The Good is anything which is in alignment or in harmony with God’s moral essence- from which flows all moral obligation to His image bearers.
3) WHAT IS THE NATURE OF GOD’S AUTHORITY? I’m not sure what is being asked. So I will answer in accordance to what I think you are driving at and you can tell me if I need to address it from a different angle. If you are asking what is the source or standard for God’s moral authority I would say this moral standard or authority is God’s very nature. God is necessarily good and therefore it is logically impossible for Him to will evil. Because His nature is necessarily good all His actions are in perfect conformity with His good nature. God’s goodness is not the fulfillment of moral obligations that exist outside Himself, but rather expressions of the way He is. This avoids both the charge of arbitrariness on the part of God as well the need for an autonomous standard that exists independent of God which He must consult before acting. It is interesting to note that when Moses asked to see God’s glory, the text reveals that God’s response is that He will show Moses His glory “by having all my GOODNESS pass before you.” (Exodus 33:18). God’s glory is equated in terms of the fact that He is wholly good. I believe this is what Jesus had in mind when he said, “No one is good except my Father.”
Towards the end his last post John implies that traditional, theological answers concerning the aforementioned questions fall quite short of the mark and he labels them as “simplistic, malleable and useless.” We aren’t told exactly where “the mark” should be or why they are simplistic and useless but we do discover his motivation in deeming them as such; that being they do not provide the “ethical vision that Christ wants us to have when we attempt to live by the Spirit…” I am all for expanding our ethical vision such that God’s kingdom is established in greater measure and I applaud John’s desire to do so. Yet I remain skeptical at best that an ethical vision that deletes the need for God can truly function in such a God honoring way. But I wish him the best.
Lastly, John points to Calvinism’s systematic appraisal of God and morals as being an example of Christian, ethical theory gone to seed. I wholeheartedly agree with John’s appraisal. Thankfully one need not be a Calvinist in order to be Christian theist. In brief Calvinism’s understanding of good and evil is based on a radical form of “Voluntarism” which states something is right simply because God willed it to be right. In contrast Non-Calvinists such as myself affirm “Christian Essentialism” which is the view that God wills X because X is right and in accordance with His own, essential, unchangeable, moral nature. So as not to mistaken, the former claim something is right merely on the basis that God willed it to be right. The later contends that God wills it because it is right. But rather than God being bound to a moral standard that exists independent or outside Himself (such as Plato’s good), God wills in perfect concert with the standard inside Himself (His necessary, moral nature). The differences may not seem all that apparent but I assure you they are. Within a Calvinist construct it is possible for God to will that love is wrong and hate and injustice are the new moral values all humans are obligated to follow- simply on the basis of God’s sovereign willing. Such a view is morally repugnant to Non-Calvinist, essentialists like myself. So I share John’s misgivings that theological lapses concerning God and ethics has helped to foster various atrocities conducted by the so-called “church.” (I’m not saying Calvinism is to blame specifically). However I do not see how grounding morality in God’s existence and morally perfect nature leaves Christianity exposed to repeat such atrocities…far from it. In fact it is the naturalist (who denies God as a moral being and moral enforcer) who runs the grave risk of reducing morality down to subjective preferences of cultural opinion. History is very much stained with that reality as well. Moreover, by John’s use of the word “atrocities” I assume he sees these actions as being objectively evil. Hypothetically if God did not exist I see no sound basis for such an objective moral condemnation to be raised.
In conclusion I would simply ask John the same questions he raised with me, as well as two additional questions.
1) What is sin?
2) What is good?
3) What is the nature/standard of God’s moral authority?
4) Why is what humans perceive as evil truly evil and good truly good? How do humans reach this assessment?
5) If God did not exist would it be wrong for a society to purge itself of innocent, mentally handicapped persons? Why or why not?
Peace.
Monday, October 22, 2007
In this post I would like to make one point: the theistic position does not provide a sufficient explanation for morality. Debates on the origin of morality have tended to leave the theists position unquestioned. This is a mistake, for what is really the case is that though it has commonly been assumed that God provides and adaquate explanation for morality, the most that we can assume is that God probably could form an adaquate basis because, to this point, the supposed explanation that God provides has been left carefully unexplained.
It seems unwise to base my position on an existential negative, since I cannot prove that there can be no explanation of morality that necessitates God, however, I think it only fair to challenge the theist to do at least that, since a common argument has been that God must be necessary because we have not figured out how to explain morality without God.
Now I will take a brief look at the sorts of discussion that theists have provided on the subject so far. I think to clarify the nature of my critique I need to admit that the traditional, Christian, theistic explanation of morality has not be inconsistent but inadequate. The theological answers to questions prove to be to simple to deal with the complex issues that we face in the real practice of morality. This is because God has not provided an explanation, but instead has actually been the explanation. On even the most complex questions the answer, instead of being profound, instead of being detailed, they have consisted of three letter answers, not discussions of how the character of God's infinite being, but merely, "G-O-D." That might be it, but can't we at least talk about what God might be like, and why we think that?
This is justified by the fact that God's character is a self sufficient necessity. It simply is the way it is, with no need for explanation, and leads every traditional Christian argument to the same unquestionable and firm, circular foundation that God is the way God is.
Now please don't misunderstand me, and can understand the notion that God could be the final unquestionable foundation for everything, but I do not think that justifies us to answer every question that we do not know the answer to with, "God." If wherever there is a question about why something is the way it is we answer, "God," then what we really mean when we say, "God," is not anything to do with the infinite being we claim to be talking about, but rather, "I don't know."
With this in mind, I would ask three questions. One: what is sin? Two: what is good? And three: what is the nature of God's authority? This last one is of particular import, for in the circular answer that we seem almost bound to as religious thinkers, this last one is the final justification for the rest: if God says it then it is the case. Here we see the end of discussion, thought, reason, freedom, and maybe even love. Its just the way it is because God's in charge and that's the way he's decided.
Now the answers that I have heard before are perfectly sound. Sin is what is contrary to God's will, what is good is whatever God says or does, or what is good is what brings Glory to God, and God's authority is the fundamental reality that he is in charge. All of these make sense, but they do not give us any information, and only displace the real question. Listening to a ten year old talk about evil gives us a better notion of what we are talking about then listening to a theologian.
Here is the case with the answers that theologians have provided: they make sense, and they make even more sense assuming a certain kind of Christianity, but they are simplistic, maleable, and useless for providing the sort of ethical vision that I think Christ wants us to have when we attempt to live by the Spirit and bring God's kingdom to earth. I will not even bother talking about how the most thorough of Christian explanations of the nature of good and evil (Calvanism), leads us finally to wonder how, when trying to define what good actually is, we start calling what we know to be bad, "good," nor how circular arguments like these have had nothing to say against all the Christian attrocities through history but instead actually functioned as a sort of justification.
And so I challenge the theist to show not just that we need God for ethics, but that God can provide a meaningful and significant ethics at all. Following this, I will provide an natural ethical theory that will not only provide an objective morality, it will be profoundly significant, and intimately tied to what it means to be a human being. It will illuminate the complexities of our experience of morality and, now listen to this and take it as a challenge, will be more consistent with the profound moral truths of the Christian scriptures than the many Christian theological positions and creeds that seem so distantly to the narratives that they claim are their foundation.
While I guarantee that my position will have a foundation that is vulnerable to criticism, that is the risk in non-circularity. Let me suggest that theology is not truth, Christ is. Theology is theory, and when a theory fails it is not for nothing. In our recognition of each failure we have a chance to take a step closer to the truth.
It seems unwise to base my position on an existential negative, since I cannot prove that there can be no explanation of morality that necessitates God, however, I think it only fair to challenge the theist to do at least that, since a common argument has been that God must be necessary because we have not figured out how to explain morality without God.
Now I will take a brief look at the sorts of discussion that theists have provided on the subject so far. I think to clarify the nature of my critique I need to admit that the traditional, Christian, theistic explanation of morality has not be inconsistent but inadequate. The theological answers to questions prove to be to simple to deal with the complex issues that we face in the real practice of morality. This is because God has not provided an explanation, but instead has actually been the explanation. On even the most complex questions the answer, instead of being profound, instead of being detailed, they have consisted of three letter answers, not discussions of how the character of God's infinite being, but merely, "G-O-D." That might be it, but can't we at least talk about what God might be like, and why we think that?
This is justified by the fact that God's character is a self sufficient necessity. It simply is the way it is, with no need for explanation, and leads every traditional Christian argument to the same unquestionable and firm, circular foundation that God is the way God is.
Now please don't misunderstand me, and can understand the notion that God could be the final unquestionable foundation for everything, but I do not think that justifies us to answer every question that we do not know the answer to with, "God." If wherever there is a question about why something is the way it is we answer, "God," then what we really mean when we say, "God," is not anything to do with the infinite being we claim to be talking about, but rather, "I don't know."
With this in mind, I would ask three questions. One: what is sin? Two: what is good? And three: what is the nature of God's authority? This last one is of particular import, for in the circular answer that we seem almost bound to as religious thinkers, this last one is the final justification for the rest: if God says it then it is the case. Here we see the end of discussion, thought, reason, freedom, and maybe even love. Its just the way it is because God's in charge and that's the way he's decided.
Now the answers that I have heard before are perfectly sound. Sin is what is contrary to God's will, what is good is whatever God says or does, or what is good is what brings Glory to God, and God's authority is the fundamental reality that he is in charge. All of these make sense, but they do not give us any information, and only displace the real question. Listening to a ten year old talk about evil gives us a better notion of what we are talking about then listening to a theologian.
Here is the case with the answers that theologians have provided: they make sense, and they make even more sense assuming a certain kind of Christianity, but they are simplistic, maleable, and useless for providing the sort of ethical vision that I think Christ wants us to have when we attempt to live by the Spirit and bring God's kingdom to earth. I will not even bother talking about how the most thorough of Christian explanations of the nature of good and evil (Calvanism), leads us finally to wonder how, when trying to define what good actually is, we start calling what we know to be bad, "good," nor how circular arguments like these have had nothing to say against all the Christian attrocities through history but instead actually functioned as a sort of justification.
And so I challenge the theist to show not just that we need God for ethics, but that God can provide a meaningful and significant ethics at all. Following this, I will provide an natural ethical theory that will not only provide an objective morality, it will be profoundly significant, and intimately tied to what it means to be a human being. It will illuminate the complexities of our experience of morality and, now listen to this and take it as a challenge, will be more consistent with the profound moral truths of the Christian scriptures than the many Christian theological positions and creeds that seem so distantly to the narratives that they claim are their foundation.
While I guarantee that my position will have a foundation that is vulnerable to criticism, that is the risk in non-circularity. Let me suggest that theology is not truth, Christ is. Theology is theory, and when a theory fails it is not for nothing. In our recognition of each failure we have a chance to take a step closer to the truth.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
Let me say first how glad I am to be participating in this endevour with Matt Bohlman. In my experiences in both the academic community and my religious one I have found that there was always dogmatism, defensiveness, pride and perhaps most dangerous, a cynicism towards the potential of dialogue amidst whatever else was going on. In the short time I have known Matt I have found him to be an exception to this rule. His positions have been very well thought out and he has been open minded, he has been sure on where he stands, and honest about where he might be vulnerable to criticism.
This makes him an ideal canditate for this present debate on the nature and ultimate source of morality, which is a most difficult of philosophical topics, dependant both upon intellectual and moral intuitions as much as any logical argument. This debate was inspired in part by the debate on the same subject between William Lane Craig and Rishard Taylor, which can be found at: "http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html"
and could provide a useful background to the debate that will follow, though the two are sure to differ significantly.
This is partially because, and I will here state not only my position, but even some of my motivations, for me this debate is almost a front for another debate that I feel can be discussed most reasonably indirectly. Matt Bohlman and I are both commited Christians, however I will be presenting a Christian position that is rarely presented as an "official" Christian position. This position is actually a sort of anti-apologetical one, and with this in mind, I will let certain Christian assumptions, that Matt and I may or may not share, go unquestioned and focus my criticisms on the points that I think are key areas where we ought to rethink our stand as Christians if we wish to take on and live out the nature of Christ.
I hope that with an intellect functioning as God made it to function, and a heart motivated with the spirit of Christ, to work towards a project best summed up by Karl Marx, who admitted that if we were able to finally tear down the human edifice of religion, that there we might finally see the reality of the divine that was so hidden underneath. This is the reality I think we might be able to expose if we were able to do away with the constructs of human reason that we use to convince ourselves that what we have made with human will and work are truly the church of God. Just as in Jesus's day, perhaps we need to leave our religion behind in order to find God.
I will quickly show my own insecurity in my position by offering up a defense even for the defense of it. I believe Christians spend too much energy in trying to prove that they are right, when God has called us to submit to His authority through acts of sacrifice, himility and love. Some might say, and I have at times been among them, that to engage in the debate, to pick a side at all, is only to encourage that which I claim to oppose.
And yet, I fear that if we do not address this crutch of human apologetics, it will always be there behind us whether we talk about it or not. At best it will be there as a solid rock of human reason, irrelevant and unoticed until we are pushed and find we have our backs up against it backs up against it, and take from it a kind of self-confidence that the foolishness of God's love could never give us. At worst it could be an object to which we silently give our spiritual confidence and which gives nothing back.
This is the position that I will be presenting. The alternative, whatever Matt may suggest that is, has seemed attractive to me in the lives of several people I know and respect, and I have heard it being worked out by Matt in an intellectually palatable way, which I hope will make for an interesting and well thought out discussion. I am not already decided, and have admitted to Matt already at least two areas in which I feel that apologetics has a good point, but I also chose the current topic as one that has seemed like a sure contest for my opponents position, but that I now intend to try to bring at least to a draw (unfortunately for those with a most keen interest in the debate on the current topic, my background interest is best served by the result of a draw, but I will try to present my position as well as possible regardless).
So I hope that the debate will prove eternally fuitfull, and more then an intellectual exercise. I certainly hope that my position will change, and be improved in the process, and that it will be an edifying experience for both of us.
This makes him an ideal canditate for this present debate on the nature and ultimate source of morality, which is a most difficult of philosophical topics, dependant both upon intellectual and moral intuitions as much as any logical argument. This debate was inspired in part by the debate on the same subject between William Lane Craig and Rishard Taylor, which can be found at: "http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/craig-taylor0.html"
and could provide a useful background to the debate that will follow, though the two are sure to differ significantly.
This is partially because, and I will here state not only my position, but even some of my motivations, for me this debate is almost a front for another debate that I feel can be discussed most reasonably indirectly. Matt Bohlman and I are both commited Christians, however I will be presenting a Christian position that is rarely presented as an "official" Christian position. This position is actually a sort of anti-apologetical one, and with this in mind, I will let certain Christian assumptions, that Matt and I may or may not share, go unquestioned and focus my criticisms on the points that I think are key areas where we ought to rethink our stand as Christians if we wish to take on and live out the nature of Christ.
I hope that with an intellect functioning as God made it to function, and a heart motivated with the spirit of Christ, to work towards a project best summed up by Karl Marx, who admitted that if we were able to finally tear down the human edifice of religion, that there we might finally see the reality of the divine that was so hidden underneath. This is the reality I think we might be able to expose if we were able to do away with the constructs of human reason that we use to convince ourselves that what we have made with human will and work are truly the church of God. Just as in Jesus's day, perhaps we need to leave our religion behind in order to find God.
I will quickly show my own insecurity in my position by offering up a defense even for the defense of it. I believe Christians spend too much energy in trying to prove that they are right, when God has called us to submit to His authority through acts of sacrifice, himility and love. Some might say, and I have at times been among them, that to engage in the debate, to pick a side at all, is only to encourage that which I claim to oppose.
And yet, I fear that if we do not address this crutch of human apologetics, it will always be there behind us whether we talk about it or not. At best it will be there as a solid rock of human reason, irrelevant and unoticed until we are pushed and find we have our backs up against it backs up against it, and take from it a kind of self-confidence that the foolishness of God's love could never give us. At worst it could be an object to which we silently give our spiritual confidence and which gives nothing back.
This is the position that I will be presenting. The alternative, whatever Matt may suggest that is, has seemed attractive to me in the lives of several people I know and respect, and I have heard it being worked out by Matt in an intellectually palatable way, which I hope will make for an interesting and well thought out discussion. I am not already decided, and have admitted to Matt already at least two areas in which I feel that apologetics has a good point, but I also chose the current topic as one that has seemed like a sure contest for my opponents position, but that I now intend to try to bring at least to a draw (unfortunately for those with a most keen interest in the debate on the current topic, my background interest is best served by the result of a draw, but I will try to present my position as well as possible regardless).
So I hope that the debate will prove eternally fuitfull, and more then an intellectual exercise. I certainly hope that my position will change, and be improved in the process, and that it will be an edifying experience for both of us.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)